Russell Roberts

Black_swan_family_2If there is one thing we can learn from the headlines of the past week or so – Market Plunge Baffles Wall Street, Size of Spill in Gulf of Mexico is Larger Than Thought, ‘Amateurish’ Bomb Defused in Times Square—it is that we cannot reliably forecast the future, that the world is bound to surprise us, frequently in unpleasant ways, and that, as the poet Robert Burns wrote, the best laid schemes of mice and men oft go awry.

Shit, as they say, happens.

And yet we keep on devising those well-laid schemes, don’t we? We extrapolate the future based on the past. We imagine that we can make useful economic forecasts (because now we have more data than we did before). We imagine that regulation will protect use from the meltdowns of markets (as well as off-shore oil drilling platforms and nuclear power plants). We imagine that the Department of Energy can lead us to a clean energy future, or that scientists can make geo-engineering safe. We imagine that we understand things better than we do. And we forget the words of that other poet, John Lennon, who wrote that “life is what happens to you while you’re busy making other plans.”

So the timing is excellent for this week’s updated version of The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, which includes a new essay called “On Robustness and Fragility.”  I’ve haven’t read the essay yet, but Taleb discussed the book and much more with my friend Russ Roberts, the Hayekian economics professor, at EconTalk. Their 67-minute conversation is never dull. [click to continue…]

{ 3 comments }

Faith-based economics

February 2, 2010

Did the stimulus package jump-start the economy? Will climate regulation create jobs? Are clean energy subsidies an efficient way to curb pollution? Is health-care spending worth it? And how worried, really, should we be about budget deficits?

Those are questions for economists. With those issues in the news, economists are in demand. They’re quoted in the press, invited to conferences, even sought out at cocktail parties. But what, really, do they have to tell us?

Russ Roberts

Russ Roberts

“It’s a very funny time to be an economist,” says Russ Roberts, an economics professor at George Mason University and a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. “Our reputation isn’t very good. Probably shouldn’t be very good. We didn’t predict the recession. We don’t have a theory on how to get out. Yet people ask us for guidance. It’s bizarre.”

Russ is an unusual economist because he spends a good deal of time trying to explain his trade to a broad public. He hosts an excellent weekly podcast called EconTalk. He has written “an economic romance” called The Invisible Heart. He blogs at Café Hayek and, most recently, produced a rap video showdown between Frederick A. Hayek and John Maynard Keynes that has amassed an astonishing 500,000 (!!!) views on YouTube.

But when Russ spoke the other day during a  day-long media colloquium at Hoover, where he was joined by John Taylor and Robert Hall, who are distinguished Stanford economists, he titled his talk: “Is Economics a Progressive Discipline?”

By progressive, he didn’t mean left of center. (Not at Hoover!) Instead, he was asking whether economics, like physics, evolves, to develop deeper or more precise knowledge about how the world works. “Do we make any progress?” he asked. His answer, in sum, was not much. Unlike physicists or mathematicians (or even, I daresay, climate scientists), economists today can’t agree on what would seem to be very fundamental questions. [click to continue…]

{ 6 comments }

How we do we live in a world we don’t understand? That question has been on my mind lately because I’m again under the sway of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of The Black Swan. Taleb did a podcast recently with the free-market (or, if you prefer) the Smith-Hayekian) economist Russell Roberts, available here at EconTalk and highly recommended.

They didn’t discuss climate policy but their conversation got me wondering what Taleb would say about the threat of climate change, particularly since I’ve been thinking about how to respond to a thoughtful commentary on climate and energy by Jesse Jenkins of The Breakthrough Institute, who blogs as Watthead, Jesse and I serve on the blogger board for The Energy Collective, a website that attracts people who are interested in the nitty-gritty of energy and climate policy. It’s a good place to keep up with people like Joe Romm and Robert Stavins.

In his post, Jesse argues in his post that a cap-and-trade policy or carbon tax designed to “put a price on carbon” – that is, to raise the cost of burning fossil fuels – won’t do nearly enough by itself to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and respond meaningfully to the threat of climate change. That’s because any policy that drives prices high enough to discourage people from burning coal and oil will, by definition, be politically unpopular. Jesse writes:

The ultimate effectiveness of a strategy premised centrally on an effort to make dirty energy more expensive will always be limited by this fundamental reality of the political economy of energy — which we at the Breakthrough Institute have dubbed “Global Warming’s Gordian Knot.” If the price of carbon must rise too high to drive emissions reductions, various cost containment mechanisms or public backlash will kick in — either of which effectively abrogates the emissions cap. Yet if we constrain the price of carbon, it will have very little impact on emissions absent a steady supply of low-cost emissions reductions opportunities.

Instead of trying to make dirty energy expensive, Jesse argues, we need to make clean energy cheap. This requires what he calls “a coordinated, well-funded and effective strategy to accelerate clean energy innovation and drive major improvements in the price and performance of clean energy technologies.” Yep, that means lots of government spending, perhaps $50 billion a year.

What does this have to do with Taleb? I’m wary of trying to summarize his worldview but Taleb essentially argues that we know a lot less than we think we know. “My major hobby,” he writes on his website, “is teasing people who take themselves & the quality of their knowledge too seriously & those who don’t have the courage to sometimes say: I don’t know….”  In essence, Taleb says we are not very good at understanding the past or present – his first book was called Fooled by Randomness–and that we are downright horrible at predicting the future. (Although he sort of predicted the global financial meltdown.)

I don’t know what Taleb thinks about climate policy or, for that matter, climate science, but I suspect that he would not have much enthusiasm for a federal government effort to spend $50 billion a year to research and commercialize technology to make clean energy cheap. None of us know  how to make clean energy cheap, and the government has a pretty poor track record of picking marketplace winners.

Here are several examples. In 1980, President Carter signed legislation to establish the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corp., to find ways to create alternatives to petroleum and promote energy independence. It flopped, of course, and one reason why is that it got caught up in pork-barrel politics. “Fuel-cell projects under the SFC, for example, were allotted to each of the 50 states, regardless of economic viability,” according to a book called “The Government Role in Civilian Technology,” by the National Academies of Science and Engineering and the Institute of Medicine.

Not long ago, Congress gave us FutureGen, the “public-private partnership to design, build, and operate the world’s first coal-fueled, near-zero emissions power plant, at an estimated net project cost of US $1.5 billion.” Well, good luck with that. An environmentalist pal of mine likes to refer to FutureGen as NeverGen.

More recently, we had the biofuels mandate in the 2007 energy bill, which was a boon to Midwest farmers and the corn ethanol industry, at least until oil prices dropped last year and big ethanol refiners went bankrupt. The politics of biofuels are incredibly complicated – the mandate was opposed by environmental groups like Friends of the Earth and by oil-state Republicans – but figuring out which biofuels make economic and environmental sense and which do not is no job for Washington.

Only markets will do that.

Now let me be clear. I am not arguing that venture capitalists or energy startups or academics or big oil companies are any smarter or more capable than U.S. Senators or DOE researchers. What I am saying is more voices (i.e., the market) are better than a few (politicians and civil servants). The way to make clean energy cheap is to create a market that promotes as much tinkering and experimentation by as many people are possible (crowdsourcing, if you like) and not by giving the government $50 billion a year to spend. Nobody knows today how to make clean energy cheap. Together we may be able to figure it out.

Best as I can tell, the best way to unleash that experimentation is with cap-and-trade or a carbon tax, by making dirty energy expensive. Ideally, by making it very expensive. This is logical and just. So long as we allow the fossil fuel industry to dump global warming pollutants into the air at no cost, that’s what the industry will do, and future generations will pay a terrible price. Better to pay more for electricity and gasoline today, right?

The question remains, how can environmentalists and their political allies persuade people to pay more for fossil fuel energy in the short run? Americans haven’t been very good lately at making sacrifices today for the sake of future generations. But with the right leadership, that can change.

One way to begin is to get our metaphors right, as Steven Chu, the new energy secretary, has argued.

Some people have said the clean energy revolution will require a national effort like the Manhattan Project or the Apollo project to send a man to the moon. Wrong—those were government-funded efforts, involving small numbers of people, aimed at a very specific goals.

Here we have a much broader goal—cheap clean energy—but no clear path to get there. Will it be wind, solar, wave or geothermal power, or clean coal, or nuclear power, or all of the above? What we need—and all credit to Chu for this metaphor—is something more like the mobilization of the U.S. economy during World War II, which involved everything from Victory Gardens (local food!) to energy conservation (“Don’t Travel—Unless Your Trip Helps Win the War”).

images10images-11images-2

Put simple, the best way to untie the Breakthrough Institute’s Gordian Knot is with politics. We need to persuade people that it’s worth paying more for dirty energy today to save the planet for our kids and grandkids.

{ 8 comments }

Hubris and the meltdown

February 4, 2009

So many forces drove  the global financial meltdown that it’s all but impossible to keep track of who and what’s to blame. My partial list: Mortgage lenders, subprime borrowers, real-estate speculators, investment banks that peddled collateralized debt obligations, other banks that held the toxic assets, lax regulators, inept or compromised bond ratings agencies, the Fed, the Treasury, the Congress for encouraging too many people to buy homes, tax policies that tilt too far in the direction of real estate and, of course,  greed, stupidity and keeping up with the Joneses. I’m sure I’ve left someone or something out.

Early this week, I spent a stimulating day at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, listening to several prominent economists explain what went wrong, why and what, if anything, can be done to fix it. I wish I’d taken this seminar before writing my FORTUNE cover story on Hank Paulson last fall, because I came away from Stanford persuaded that Paulson, Ben Bernanke and other in the Bush administration (yes, including our current treasury secretary, Timothy Geithner)  were too slow to grasp the depth and seriousness of the crisis. I was also persuaded that the stimulus package now awaiting action in Congress probably won’t do the job, despite its enormity. But before we get to that, I want to show you a chart that points to yet another explanation for the current mess that we’re in:

See what the chart shows? Or seems to show? We’re getting a lot smarter, or at least the people in charge of the economy are. The U.S. struggled with recessions for most of the 19th and 20th centuries until the period from 1982 to 2007, a long stretch which gave us “the best macroeconomic performance in our history,” said Michael J. Boskin, a professor of economics at Stanford, who showed this chart. (You may know his name because he was chairman of the president’s council of economic advisors during the first Bush administration,) The Dow, he reminded us, was at 770 in 1982. By the early 2000s, the conventional wisdom held that smart monetary policy, a.k.a. the genius of Alan Greenspan, and structural changes in the economy, that is, the information technology revolution, drove this remarkable economic performance. Reinforcing the view that mere mortals knew how to manage the increasingly complex and interconnected economy was the fact that each time the economy or the stock market hit a bump, including such big bumps as the 1987 stock-market crash or the 2001 terrorist attacks, the economy and the markets bounced back very quickly.

You remember how that felt, don’t you? Those were the days of “Buy on the dips” and Dow 36000. Risk? Why, the I-banks had sophisticated, proprietary models that reassured them that risk was under control, as Joe Nocera explained last month in an excellent magazine story in The Times.

Of course,  the people in charge weren’t quite as smart as they thought they were. Nor, truth be told, were the rest of us, at least those of us who turned their houses into ATM machines or neglected to read the fine print in our adjustable rate mortgages.

It’s one more reminder, not that we need one, that perhaps the most underrated quality in a business or political leader is humility. Knowing what you don’t know is worth a lot. So is admitting to uncertainty. That, at least, was my big takeaway from the day-long immersion with these very smart economists. Even with 20/20 hindsight, they don’t know for sure what caused the meltdown. And they certainly can’t agree on how to dig ourselves out.

As Russsell Roberts, an economics professor at George Mason University and a Hoover research fellow put it: “If you laid all the economists in the world end to end, they still wouldn’t reach a conclusion.” Roberts organized the program and meeting him was a  a highlight of my trip because I’m a regular listener to his excellent series of podcasts in which he interviews economists, called EconTalk. They’re available on iTunes.

Here are just a couple of other highlights from my day at Stanford:

Serious warning signs that something was truly awry with the U.S. economy were evident by the fall of 2007. John Taylor, another Stanford prof and one of the world’s preeminent monetary theorists, delivered an eye-popping presentation in which he argued, persuasively, that Paulson & Co. badly misdiagnosed the problem with the financial markets in late 2007 and early 2008. I wish I could reproduce his argument here, but the essence is that beginning in August 2007, after the collapse of several housing-related hedge funds, unprecedented and truly shocking interest rate spreads arose between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month overnight index swap. (Don’t ask me to explain, please.) These spreads were essentially alarm bells, signaling financial stress. “We call it a black swan in the financial markets,” Taylor said, referring to the now-famous book by Nassim Nicholas Taleb.

Paulson, Bernanke & Co. misdiagnosed the problem, according to Taylor. They thought the problem was lack of liquidity. So they made it easier for banks to borrow, cut interest rates and supported last March’s ineffective fiscal stimulus. Taylor argued that this prolonged the crisis. The real reason that the spread increased was that big lenders no longer trusted big borrowers to pay back their loans. Even today, by all accounts, the credit markets are not functioning well.

Of course, the lenders were right to be worried about risk because the big banks – Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill and Citigroup – were all insolvent or close to it. “One of the surprising things,” Taylor said, “is how little the CEOs and boards knew about the instruments that were on their balance sheets. That was amazing.” Hubris.

For those who want to know more, Taylor has a small book (less than 100 pages) coming out soon called Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged and Worsened the Financial Crisis.

Alan Greenspan caused the crisis—or he didn’t. Boskin and Taylor both place much of the blame for the housing bubble and resulting crash on Greenspan. They argue that the fed kept interest rates too low for too long even as the economy grew briskly after the 2001-2002 recession. Real interest rates, that is, interest rates after inflation, were negative, setting off a frenzy of borrowing. Said Boskin: “You get to borrow $100 and you’re only going to have to pay back $98.” Aggregate U.S. credit market debt went from about 2 times GDP in 1990 to 3.5 times GDP by 2007, he said.

“People were getting mortgages of several hundred thousand dollars who couldn’t quality for an auto loan,” Boskin said.

Meanwhile, investment banks like Bear Stearns and Lehman took on so much debt that a decline in the value of their mortgage-backed assets pushed them into insolvency. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley “were maybe a week from insolvency,” Taylor said. Again, this was hubris–these guys figured they were too smart be so wrong.

But Robert Hall, another Stanford prof, defended Greenspan. The low interest rates in the early part of the decade, he argued, were responsible monetary policy to head off deflation, not an irresponsible contribution to a housing bubble. Deflation is a “very, very large danger to the country,” Hall said. “With deflation, people’s debts become larger and larger relative to their incomes. That causes more and more collapse.” Hall and economist Susan Woodward have posted their own detailed analysis of the financial crisis and recession, which is well worth reading, at their website.

There was lots, lots, lots more, including Hall’s argument that the fiscal stimular before Congress, while badly needed, won’t be spent fast enough. A better approach, he said, would be for Congress to encourage people to spend more right away—by, for example, having the federal government pay all state sales taxes for the rest of the year. The three Stanford profs all forecast a very gloomy 2009, I’m sorry to report.

Then again, as Russ Roberts argued, no one really knows what’s going to happen or how we can best dig ourselves out of this hole. The problems are so complicated, the variables so many, the historical precedents are so few.

“In the debate over the stimulus, we have Nobel laureates on both sides,” Roberts says. “What does that tell you?”

{ 1 comment }